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I. Introduction
The proposition that under a floating exchange rate regime restrictive
monetary policy can lead to substantial 'overshooting' of thenominal and real
exchange rate is now accepted fairly widely. The fundamental reason is the
presence of nominal stickiness or inertia in domesticfactor and product markets
combined with a freely flexible nominal exchange rate. Current and anticipated
future monetary policy actions are reflected immediately in the nominalexchange
rate, set as it is in a forward-looking efficient auction marketwhile they are
reflected only gradually and with a lag in domestic nominal labour costs and/or
goods prices. Nominal appreciation of the currency therefore amounts to real
appreciation - a loss of competitiveness. Since in most of the simple analytical
models used to analyse the overshooting propositions there is no long-run effect
of monetary policy on the real exchange rate, any short-run real appreciation
implies an overshooting of the long-run equilibrium. The transitory (but
potentially quite persistent) loss of competitiveness is associated with a decline in
output below its capacity level. This excess capacity is oneof the channels
through which restrictive monetary policy brings down the rate of domestic cost
and price inflation.
One of the virtues claimed for the sharp initial appreciation of the nominaland
real exchange rate in response to a previously unanticipated tighteningof the
stance of monetary policy is its immediate effect on thedomestic price level. The
domestic currency prices of those internationally traded goods whoseforeign
currency prices can be treated as exogenous willdecline by the same proportion
as the increase in the value of thedomestic currency. To a greater or lesser extent
*The authors have benefitted from discussions with Avinash Dixit. Financial support from the
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the same holds even for those internationally traded goods where the home
country is large in relation to the world market. Both through its effect on the
prices of internationally traded final goods and through its effect on the price of
imported raw materials and intermediate inputs, a sudden step appreciation of
the exchange rate will immediately bring down the domestic price level. In this
paper we shall argue that the effect of such exchange rate jumps is merely to
redistribute the cost of reducing inflation over time: early gains have to be
'handed back' later as the equilibrium level of competitiveness is restored. Crucial
to this argument is the assumption of stickiness of some nominal domestic cost
component. In our model this is built in by our assumption of a predetermined
nominal money wage and through our specification of the behaviour of the 'core'
or underlying rate of inflation,it,the augmentation term in the wage Phillips
curve. Subject to one quite significant qualification, the core rate of inflation is
viewed as predetermined with its behaviour over time governed bya first-order
partial adjustment mechanism. It can be thought of as an adaptive expectations
mechanism for the labour market although we do not favour that interpretation.
In our view the core rate of inflation, which is a distributed lag on past rates of
inflation, stands for all the factors in the economy that give inertia to built-in
trends in wages and prices. Also, whereas the level of the money wage is always
treated as predetermined,it,while determined by a 'backward-looking' process,
can make discrete jumps at a point in time. This will happen whenever there is a
discrete jump in the general price level. In our model this can occur either if the
exchange rate jumps or if there is a change in indirect taxes. Since the exchange
rate is a forward-looking price which responds to 'news' about current and future
shocks, the underlying rate of inflation indirectly and to a limited extent also
responds to such shocks.
To put the present paper in perspective it is useful to relateour current
approach to that of an earlier paper [Buiter and Miller (1981)]. This is done in
section 2 where a simple model of real exchange rate overshooting is discussed.
Section 3 contains some modifications of the simple model. It is here thatwe
discuss the implications of assuming flexibility of domestic nominal wage costs.
While we do not believe that such a 'neo-classical' specification is appropriate for
the analysis of an advanced industrial economy like the U.K., the discussion of
this case helps bring out the crucial nature of the assumption of nominal inertia in
the behaviour of domestic costs. Section 4 analyzes in some detail the behaviour
of the model with sluggish 'core' inflation.
2. A simple model of real exchange rate overshooting
A slightly simplified version of the model in Buiter and Miller (1981) is given in
eqs. (I)(5), all variables except for r,Td, T", It,B andtbeing in logs,
m - p 0 = ky - A(r -rd), k,A.>0, (1)WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting 241
y= _y(r_Dp_DO)+(e+p*_p),y,5>O, (2)
Dp = çby +it, 4'>0, (3)
(4)
De=r_r*_r. (5)
The notation is as follows:
m = nominal money stock (exogenous),
p = domestic pricelevel'atfactorcost',i.e.,excluding indirecttaxes
(predetermined),
= foreign price level (exogenous),
y= real output (endogenous),
r= domestic nominal interest rate on non-moneyassets (endogenous),
ra = nominal interest rate paid ondomestic money (exogenous),
r* = foreign nominal interest paid on non-money assets (exogenous),
0= rate of indirect tax (exogenous),
e= exchange rate (domestic currencyprice of foreign currency) (endogenous),
it= trend or core rate of inflation(endogenous),
rate of tax on capital inflows or subsidy on outflows (exogenous),
D = differential operator, i.e., Dx(t)(d/dt)x(t),
D =right-hand-side differential operator, i.e.,Dx(t)=lim; (x(flx(t))/
(T -
Eq. (1) is the LM curve: m denotes a fairly wide monetary aggregate such as
£M3 which consists to a significant extent (50-60%) of interest-bearing deposits.
We therefore measure the opportunity cost of holding money bythe interest
differential between the loan rate, r, and the own rate on time deposits(rd).Eq. (2)
is the IS curve. Demand for domestic output depends on the short real interest
rate and on the relative price of foreign and domesticgoods. A fiscal policy
variable could be added without difficulty. Preferable alternative specifications
include replacing the short real interest rate by the long real interest rate and
modelling output as predetermined, with its rate of change depending on the
excess of ex ante effective demand over the level ofreal output. This would
preclude the unrealistic immediate jumps in real output in response to e.g. a loss
of competitiveness which are a feature of the current model. This country is small
in the world market for its importables so that it takes p" as given. It is large in the
world market for its exportables. No explicit distinction is made between traded
and non-traded goods. Eq. (3) is the agumented Phillips curve. By choice of units
(the logarithm of) capacity 9utput is set equal to zero. The augmentation termitis
identified, in (4) with the right-hand-side time derivative of the money supply.
Thus even if m were to make a discrete jump, the price level would not jump. This242 WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
is one way of imposing the crucial property of nominal inertia, stickiness or
sluggishness. Eq. (5) reflects the assumption of perfect capital mobility and perfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds. Risk-neutral speculators
equate the uncovered interest differential in favour of the domestic country, net of
any tax on capital imports, to the expected rated of depreciation of the
domestic currency. The country is small in the world financial markets and r* is
treated as given. The assumption of rational expectations, employed in
Dornbusch (1976), Liviatan (1980) and Buiter and Miller (1981), is equivalent to
perfect foresight in out deterministic model. It is used in eqs. (2) and (5). For
simplicity the foreign price level, pK, is assumed to be constant. Choice of units
sets it equal to zero, so competitiveness is measured by ep.
The own rate of interest on money is assumed exogenous. In a competitive
banking system with a binding required reserve ratio h (0<h<1) on all bank
deposits, the loan rate r and the deposit rate rd are linked by ra=(l h)r(TD
+ DD)TD'. TD is the volume of interest-bearing time deposits and DDthe
volume of non-interest-bearing demand deposits. If demand deposits are only a
small fraction of the total, then rd(1 - h)r. This can be used to eliminate r from
the model. The main consequence is to reduce the interest sensitivity of money
demand. We prefer treating r as exogenous so that discretionary changes in r
can be used to describe policy actions to alter the degree of competitiveness of the
banking system. The dynamics of the system is conveniently summarized in terms
of the two state variables I and c,
m -p,
Ce - p.
Real liquidity, I, is a backward-looking or predetermined variable. It only
makes discrete jumps when the policy instrument m changes discontinuously.
Real competitiveness c is a forward-looking or jump variable. It jumps










'For simplicity, the term DO in eq. (2) has been ignored. We consider it in section 4.
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A necessary and sufficient condition for the stationary equilibrium of this model
to be a saddlepoint is y(2 - k) ). <0.2 This is equivalent to the condition that, at
a given real exchange rate, an exogenous increase in aggregate demand raises
output.
Assuming that the conditions for the existence of a saddlepoint equilibrium are
satisfied, it is easily checked that the long-run equilibrium has the following
properties. Output is equal to its full employment value, 0. The steady-state real
interest rate, r - Dp equals r* - Dp* + t = r" + r since we assume that the foreign
rate of inflation is zero. The nominal interest rate r equals r* + t + De = r* + t
+Dp_Dp* =r*+t+Dm_Dp*. Long-run competitiveness is independent of
Dm, 0 and ra but improves when r* + t increases. The steady-state stock of real
money balances I decreases when Dm or r* + t increase but increases when 0 or ra
increase.
We now briefly summarize the effects on competitiveness and output of a
number of policy actions similar to the ones implemented by the Thatcher
government.
2.1. An unanticipated and immediately implemented reduction in the rate of
monetary growth
There is no long-run effect on competitiveness associated with a reduction in
the monetary growth rate. The steady-state stock of real money balances increases
owing to the lower nominal interest rate associated with the lower steady-state
rate of inflation. The dynamics are described in fig. 1. The reduction in Dm is
implemented as soon as it is first anticipated. The initial long-run equilibrium is at
E1, the new one at E2. For convenience we assume that the initial position is also
at E1. To achieve convergence to the new equilibrium the nominal exchange rate
jumps so as to put the system on the saddlepath SS' through E2. With p
predetermined, ajump in e corresponds to a jump inc. This jump-appreciation of
the real exchange rate to E12 in response to an unanticipated reduction in the rate
of monetary growth is associated with a decline in output and a fall in the nominal
interest rate. Note from eqs. (3) and (4) that 'on impact' the reduction in Dm
lowers the rate of inflation by more than the change in the rate of growth of the
money supply: ceteris paribus there is a one-for-one relationship between Dp and
Dm. The induced decline in output further lowers the rate of inflation. This
somewhat implausible feature of the model will be removed below in section 4.
From the LM equation (1) it can be seen that with r and 0 exogenous and I
predetermined, r and y have to move in the same direction in response to any
exogenous shock. The nominal interest falls in response to the monetary growth
deceleration, reflecting the current and anticipated future success of the anti-
2The equilibrium is a saddlepoint if the state matrix has one stable and one unstable characteristic
root. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that the determinant of the state matrix be
negative.244 WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
C
Fig. 1. Reductions in monetary growth.
inflationary strategy. To equate the demand for money to its predetermined real
supply, output falls. The reduction in output is achieved both through
appreciation of the real exchange rate and through the increase in the real interest
rate.3 To avoid the conclusion of our model that a reduction in the rate of growth
of the money stock lowers the nominal interest rate, the money demand function
would have to be modified. Possible modifications are the following. The
inclusion of a long rate of interest in the money demand function. Even if the
nominal interest rate on long-term debt declines in response to the anti-
inflationary strategy, the short rate may rise in the short run. Similar conclusions
for the behaviour of the short rate would follow if the (expected) rate of inflation
were to have a negative effect on the demand for money. Finally, wealth effects on
the demand for money could be included. A fall in the long-term nominal interest
rate means an upward revaluation of private sector holdings of long-dated public
debt. This would raise the demand for money, thus rendering a decline in output
consistent with an increase in the short nominal interest rate.
2.2. A previously unanticipated future reduction in the rate of monetary growth
If the unanticipated reduction in monetary growth does not occur until an
interval of length Thas lapsed after the announcement, the behaviour of c and un
31t is easily checked that r declines less than Dp. Note also that we can use (2) and (5) to obtain y=
yDc+&y(rt+i). Immediately following the unanticipated reduction in Dm, c is lower and Dc
becomes positive. This causes v to fall.WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting 245
fig. 1 follows the path E1 E'12TE2.When the 'news' breaks there is ajump
appreciation of the real exchange rate to E'12. This places the system on that
unique unstable trajectory, drawn with reference to the initial equilibrium, which
will cause it to arrive on the unique convergent path SS' through E2 after an
interval of duration Tin the absence of further 'news' no other discrete jumps in e
and c occur, reflecting the assumption that the behaviour of risk-neutral
speculators will eliminate anticipated future jumps in e, as these would be
associated with infinite anticipated rates of capital gain or loss.
2.3. The medium-term financial strategy
The medium-term financial strategy (MTFS) of the Thatcher government had
as its centrepiece an announced sequence of four annual one-point reductions in
the target range of monetary growth. Approximating the range by its central
value, the response of the system to the unanticipated and immediate introduction
of the MTFS can be depicted as in fig. 2.If there were only a single unanticipated
one-point reduction in the rate of monetary growth, c wouldjump immediately to
E12 on S1S1. If the entire four point reduction in Dm were to be implemented
immediately, the system would jump to E'12 on S4S4.
The actual eflèct is intermediate between these two extremes. The initial jump
in c takes it beyond E12 to a point such as T0 because the magnitude of the initial
jump in c is a function of the announced future reductions in monetary growth.
Under rational expectations the system must follow a path which will, without
future jumps in competitiveness, put it on S4S4 when the fourth and final year of
the MTFS dawns. We assume that no further reductions in monetary growth are
planned after the fourth year. If a non-inflationary rate of monetary growth is the
long-term target and if the MTFS is likely to be extended to achieve this purpose,
a further five or six years of successive one-percentage-point reductions in Dm
should be added to the picture of fig. 2. The initial jump in c would be
correspondingly greater. All this assumes of course that the inflationary
mechanism, and more specifically the degree of nominal inertia in the level of p,
remains unchanged, regardless of how far in advance monetary growth
reductions are announced and irrespective of the degree of belief attached to these
announcements. The four-year MTFS leads in fig. 2 to an immediate loss of
competitiveness, which places the system at T0 below E12. After this there is a
sequence of connected one-year-long paths (T0 - T1, T1 - T2, T2 - 7'3) which will
place the system on the convergent path S4S4 through E4 at the beginning of the
fourth and final year of the MTFS. Each one-year-long path 7 (i = 1,2,3)
follows a divergent trajectory, drawn with reference to the long-run equilibrium
E, because during the ith year the system is 'driven' by the values of the forcing
variables for that year.
4We assume that the policy announcement was unanticipated and credibleperhaps a doubtful
assumption.246 WH. Butter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
9.
Fig. 2. The medium-term financial strategy.
2.4. An unanticipated increase in direct taxes
To model the important monetary aspects of the Conservative government's
fiscal policy, we consider a fiscally neutral increase in the rate of indirect taxation,
0. There is assumed to be no direct effect on aggregate demand because the
increase in indirect taxes is matched by a reduction in direct taxes. The price
equation 'at factor cost' is assumed unaffected by the reduction in direct taxes. To
justify this assumption for the wage component of factor costs, one could
plausibly postulate a labour supply schedule that is perfectly inelastic with
respect to the after-tax real wage. The long-run effect of an increase in 0 is an
increase in I = m - p by the same amount as the increase in 0. With the path of m
exogenous, prices net of indirect tax decline so that market prices follow their
previous path and m - p 0 is unchanged in the steady state. The dynamic
behaviour of the economy is described in fig. 3. It is qualitatively the same as that
following a reduction inDin.The exchange rate jump-appreciates and output
declines. Fig. 3 also describes the consequences of an unanticipated immediate
increase in ra. The abolition of the 'corset', which we model (crudely) as an increase
in rd, is estimated to have increased money demand by about 4%.
5The Thatcher government's 8% increase in VAT has been estimated to be equivalent to a 4
percentage point increase in the average rate of indirect taxation, 0.C
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9.
Fig. 3. Unanticipated increase in indirect taxes.
2.5. An unanticipated increase in the level of the money stock
An unanticipated and immediately implemented once-and-for-all increase in m
does not alter the long-run equilibrium real money stock or level of
competitiveness. With p predetermined, an increase in m is an increase in 1. The
behaviour of the economy when subjected to such a shock is described in fig. 4.
The initial and final equilibrium are both at E1. The initial real money stock is I
=m1 Pi. The unanticipated increase in m raises the real money stock to 12 =
m2p1, m2>m1. The real exchange rate jump-depreciates to E12 to place the
system on the convergent saddlepath SS' through E1. Output expands and the
nominal interest rate falls on impact. Note the difference between an increase in
m and an increase in Dm. Both are expansionary in the short-run, but while an
increase in Dm raises the nominal interest rate, an increase in m lowers it. Neither
policy action affects long-run competitiveness, but while a once-and-for-all
increase in the level of the nominal money stock leaves long-run real balances
unchanged, an increase in the rate of growth of the nominal money stock will, by
raising inflation and the nominal interest rate, reduce the long-run stock of real
money balances.
Comparing fig. 4 with figs. 1 and 3 suggests a way of. avoiding the excess
capacity and the loss of competitiveness associated with policies to reduce the
rate of inflation by reducing the rate of monetary growth and with switches from
direct to indirect taxation. Consider an initial equilibrium at E1 in fig. 5. An
unanticipated immediate reduction in Dm (or increase in 0 or r) would, by itself,
move the economy to E12, with real exchange rate appreciation and excess
capacity resulting during the transition to the new long-run equilibrium E2. The
reason for this costly disequilibrium adjustment is stickiness of the real money248 WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
Fig. 4. Unanticipated increase in the level of the money stock.
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supply. This is the result of the combination of price level stickiness, an assumed
feature of the private economy, and stickiness in the level of the nominal money
stock, the result of a deliberate policy choice. It is easy in the present model to
calculate the increase in the level of the nominal money stock that would
immediately achieve the required long-run increase in real balances without any
need for the price level path to be adjusted downward. Without a lump' in the
level of the nominal money stock the price equationDp= tbv+Dmtells us that
the only way of lowering p relative tomis through excess capacity. The required
nominal money stock jump is simply l211. By itself, an increase inmby that
amount would move the system to E'12. A combination of a reduction inDm(or
an increase in U or in rd) and an increase inmof the right magnitude will
immediately and without transitional loss of competitiveness and output, place
the economy at E2. The jump appreciation associated with the reduction in the
rate of monetary growth, the increase in indirect taxation or the increased
competitiveness of the banking system, and the jump depreciation associated
with the increase in the level of the money stock cancel each other out exactly. It
can be argued that the government's decision not to try to recoup the large
overshoot during the second half of 1980 of the £M3 target amounts to an
(involuntary) rn-jump of the kind advocated here. Whatever the motivation, it has
prevented a further massive deflationary jolt to an economy already going
through the worst recession since the 1930's.
3. Real exchange rate overshooting and the wageprice process
A crucial component of all models exhibiting disequilibrium overshooting of
the real exchange rate is the wageprice process. The price equation used in the
paper so far, as in many others [e.g. Buiter and Miller (1981), Dornbusch (1976)],
has a number of weaknesses. It is important to perform a 'sensitivity analysis' of
the specification of this equation in order to establish the robustness of the
overshooting proposition.
3.1. Adirect effectofthe exchange rate on the domestic price level
Even if domestic wage costs are sticky in nominal terms, so that the money
wage rate, w, can be treated as predetermined, the domestic price level might in an
open economy still be capable of making discrete jumps at a point in time. This
will be the case if the domestic currency price of internationally traded goods is a
function of the exchange rate. A convenient way of representing this notion is to
express the domestic price level, p, as a weighted average of the sticky domestic
money wage and the domestic currency value of an appropriate (trade-weighted)
index of world prices, p". Making the small country assumption that p" is given250 WH. Butterand M. Miller, Real exchange rate ouershooting
and choosing units such that p"=O, we have
p=ow+(lcx)e,0o1.6 (8)
Eq. (3) is then replaced by
Dw=y+m. (9)
For the time being we still assume that
n=Dm.
With< 1, the domestic price level is no longer predetermined.The jump
appreciation of the nominal (and real) exchange rate in response to e.g. an
unanticipated reduction in the rate of monetary growth will have the immediate
effect of lowering the price level. However, as long as>0, the earlier analysis is
not affected qualitatively. We redefine our state variables as follows:
1= m - w,
c=ew. (lOb)
As before, us predetermined (except when mjumps) and c is ajump variable. The






more general approach is the following. Let p, be the price of domestically produced goods. It is
a weighted average of unit labour costs, w, and unit imported intermediate input costs: e + p1, i.e.,
PH =f31w+(1 _/Jj)(e+p*I),0f3 1. (12')
Dm
[y2- 42y(l - c)- 4y - 1xy2r* + r
I22+y(kA.) 2 C
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It is easily seen that (7) is the special case of (11) with c=1. A necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a unique saddle-point equilibrium is
cy(4k)-2<O, (12)
which again has the interpretation that, at a given level of competitiveness, an
increase in aggregate demand increases output. The single convergent path is
again upward-sloping and the real exchange rate overshooting results of
section 2 carry over to the more plausible model under consideration here.
The main change from the previous analysis with c=1, is that the exchange
rate appreciation consequent upon restrictive monetary policy actions (or
increases in 0 orrd)now has an immediate beneficial effect on the price level
although as long as ot>O, a given percentage appreciation of e will be
associated with a smaller percentage reduction in p.
The special case x=O represents the 'law of one price' for all goods or
instantaneous purchasing power parity (P.P.P.). Although few propositions in
economics have been rejected more convincingly by the data than P.P.P. [Kravis
and Lipsey (1978), Frenkel (1981), Isard (1977)] it is mentioned briefly for
completeness. With the domestic price level moving perfectly in line with the
exchange rate, the wage equation (9) which still incorporates stickiness in the level
of the money wage, ceases to be relevant to the rest of the model. The relative price
of domestic and foreign goods is constant. Real output is a function of the
exogenous real interest rate. Unless we impose the requirement thatsteady-state
real wages are constant, output need not be at its full employment level.
Alternatively we could add an equation making output a (decreasing) function of
the real wage. As this model has little to recommend it, we shall not pursue it any
further here.
3.2. Money wage flexibility and real wage flexbilIty
We now consider the case where both the money wage and the real wage are
perfectly flexible, and output is always at its equilibrium or capacity value, 0. We
can view this as the case where the core rateof wage inflation,t,equals the
expected (and actual) rate of wage inflation, i.e.,
ic=Dw. (4')
The domestic price level or c.p.i. is a weighted average of the price of domestically produced goods and
the price of imported final goodse+*F, i.e.,
PP2PH+U _/32)(e+p*I),O/321. (12")
For our purposes not much is lost by using the simpler formulation in (12). An alternative
interpretation in terms of traded and untraded goods is also possible.252 WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
The model of eqs. (1), (2), (8), (9), (4') and (5) has the following very simple state-
space representation:
[D11[F' y1(5-(1-cL)A'l[l [Dc][ 0 y1(5][c
Dm
[1__1(1_) A-111 r*+r _-1 ooj o
rd
With both e and w freely flexible, neither of the two state variables I and c is
predetermined. A unique convergent solution trajectory exists because there are
now two unstable characteristic roots (A1 and y(5). The system is also
recursive, with Dc independent of! and also of the policy instruments Dm, r1 and
0. Only a real shock (such as a change in the foreign real interest rater* + v) will
affect the dynamics and steady state behaviour of c.
The diagrammatic representation of the system is given in fig. 6. Without loss of
generality we assume that the Dl = 0 locus is downward-sloping. Consideran
unexpected, immediately-implemented reduction in Dm. The initial equilibrium
is at E1, the new equilibrium at E2. Note that these equilibria are completely
unstable. Since the cut in the monetary growth rate is immediately implemented,!
jumps immediately from E1 to E2 with no change in c. Monetary disinflation is
costless. If we consider a previously unanticipated future reduction in Dm, 1 will




Fig. 6. Money disturbances (with money and real wage flexibility).
Dl. = 0 Dl.' = 0future policy change is announced. After that it moves gradually in a straightline
from E12 to E2 where the system arrives at the moment that Dm is actually
reduced. Again there is no effect on competitiveness in the short run or in the long
run.
It is instructive to contrast monetary disturbances with a real shocksuch as
an increase in r* + x, analysed in fig. 7. The steady-stateeffect is to alter the long-
run equilibrium from E1 to E2, lowering 1 andraising c. If the increase in r* +t
occurs immediately both c and 1 jump to E2 withoutdelay. If we have a future
increase in r* + r, the system jumps to an intermediate position such as E12 after
which it proceeds gradually to E2 where it arrives when r" + t is actuallyraised.
Note that this adjustment of the real exchange rate is anequilibrium
phenomenon, taking place at a constant level of output.
C
WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting 253
Fig. 7. Real disturbances (with money and real wage flexibility).
3.3. Money wage flexbility and real wage rigidity
Some recent work on wage and price behaviour can be interpreted as
combining the assumption of perfectly flexible money wages with the assumption
of sluggish adjustment in the real wage. The latter is treated as predetermined
because of (generally unspecified) transactions and adjustment costs.
Consider e.g. the following specification for i:
n.=Dp(wp), (4")+
Note that real wage rigidity implies real exchange rate rigidity as wp=(c
- 1)c. With a flexible money wage, I now is ajump variable. The roles of-i and c as
predetermined and jump variables is the exact reverse of what it is in the model
with sticky money wages (and flexible real wages) of section 2. The two
characteristic roots of eq. (15) are' and - [(l- ) +45]/[1 - ci(1 + y4,)]. The
sign of the second root - the one governing the behaviour of cdepends on the
sign of l(l+y4). This has the following interpretation. Add an exogenous




254 W.H. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
Eq. (4"), in combination with (9), yields
= çby + Dp -- p), (14)
or
D(w- p) = çby -- p). (14')
Eq. (14) can be viewed as a rational expectations version of the kind of equation
proposed by Sargan (1980). It is also very close to an equation found in Minford
(1980) although his equation incorporates nominal stickiness. The state-space
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Dc=(/(cc 1))yc.





+ f. 1 c(1 +y)
For 01, 1ci(1 + y4) must be positive if an exogenous increase in demand is
to raise output at a given level of competitiveness. We shall make thisassumption.
It implies that the root governing c is negative. Note that with eq. (14') governing
thebehaviour of the real wage, there is no automatic tendency for the level of
output to converge to its capacity level 0. In long-run equilibrium we have [setting
D(wp)=0],
'1 y=(wp)=(ci 1)c.
The system is still dichotomized, and the behaviour of c, wp, y and rDp is
independent of monetary shocks, but even if we start at full employment, real
shocks will not necessarily be followed by a return to full employment. Only if
( the coefficient on the lagged real wage inthe wage equation) is zero will the
system tend to full employment. This can be shown as follows. In long-run
equilibrium the IS equation is
y= (18)
Combining (17) and (18) gives
(x-1)y(r*+t)(-1)5z
c(1c
Apart from the absence of an automatic return to full employment the
behaviour of the flexible money wagesticky real wage model is qualitatively
the same when=0 and when j >0. The response to an unanticipated reduction
in Dm is shown in fig. 8. An unanticipated immediately-implemented reduction in
Dm instantaneously moves the system to the new stationary equilibrium E2
without any change in c, y or rDp. An announced future reduction in Dm
instantaneously moves the system to an intermediate position such as E12,
between E1 and E2 from where it moves gradually to E2 where it arrives at the
(17)
(19)





Fig. 8. Money disturbances (with money wage flexibility and real wage rigidity).
moment that the reduction in Dm actually occurs. This whole process again takes
place without any changes in c, y or r - Dp.
Now consiuer the effect of an increase in r* + in this model, which changes the
long-run equilibrium in fig. 9 from E1 to a point such as E2. With c
predetermined, an immediate unanticipated increase in r* + t causes an equal
jump increase in e and w, lowering ito E12. From there c and 1 converge gradually
to the new long-run equilibrium E2 along the unique convergent trajectory S'S'. A
previously unanticipated future increase in r* + r leads to an immediate jump in I
down to a point intermediate between E1 and E12, such as E'12. From there 1
declines gradually to E12 where it arrives when r* +r is actually raised. c and
i then increase gradually along SS' towards E2.
It is interesting to see what happens to the wage equation (14') when the
exchange rate has no effect on the price level, i.e., when z = 1. In that áase the price
equation (8) becomes
p= w, (20a)
while the wage equation reduces to
cby =- p). (20b)
Eqs. (20a) and (20b) imply that y = 0 at each instant. The model now is in many
ways the same as the model with money wage and real wage flexibility discussed
in section 3.2 and summarized in eq. (13). The link between the real wage and theWH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting 257
9.
Fig. 9. Real disturbances (with money wage flexibility and real wage rigidity).
real exchange rate, given by wp=(c--l)c in the general model, disappears.
Even though the real wage is still predetermined (and indeed remains constant
throughout at 0), the real exchange rate again becomes a jump variable. Because
w still is a jump variable, I also stays that way. The state-space representation of
this version of the model is given in
- Dm -
[Dl1[A-1 y'5l[ll[10 A1 r*+t
[Dcj[ 0y1][c]+[O0 00 ] 0
ra
The response of this sytem to nominal and real shocks is qualitative similar to
that described in section 3.2 and figs. 6 and 7.
3.4. Rational expectations in the labour market with money wage stickiness
Without changing the equation for the core rate of inflation (4") and the
associated wage equation (14) of the previous section, a single change of
assumption concerning the behaviour of the money wage destroys the classical
policy implications of that model. The crucial change in assumption is to rule out
discrete jumps in w, that is to require w to be a continuous function of time. The
(21)258 WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
exchange rate, however, is still free to make discrete jumps at a point in time. This
change in assumption does not rule out a rational expectations interpretation of
(14). This is particularly obvious if we assume that j=O. The behaviour of this
rational expectations model of the labour market is, however, very different from
the classical behaviour of the models of sections 3.2 and 3.3. Instead it resembles
the behaviour of the sticky money wage model of section 2 and 3.1. Monetary
shocks lead to real exchange rate overshooting and departures of actual from
capacity output. Note that this kind of behaviour is ruled out when= 1. This
'closed economy' representation means that rational expectations automatically
rule out departures of output from capacity output.7 With the assumed
asymmetry in the behaviour of c and w, and with a direct effect of eon p, monetary
shocks will alter the real wage and the real exchange rate and cause departures
from full employment.
With the sticky money wage interpretation of eq. (14), land c again assume the
roles of section 2. l is predetermined while c (via e) can jump in response to 'news'.





Fig. 10. Reduction of money growth (with money wage stickiness).
If the reduction in Dm takes place immediately C jump appreciates to E?2. After
that it moves gradually to E2 along S'S'. From eq. (16d) we see that this jump-
appreciation of c will be associated with a fall in output. An anticipated
future reductionin Dm willbe associatedwith a smaller immediate
jump-appreciation of c when the news arrives, to E2 say. Thisjump places c and I
'These issues are discussed for the fixed exchange rate case in Buiter (1978, 1979).WU. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting 259
on the divergent path, driven by the values of the forcing variables determining E1
that will put it on the convergent path through E2 (S'S') when the cut in Dm is
actually implemented. An equal reduction in Dm at a more distant future time will
again be associated with smaller initial jump-appreciation of c (to E2 say) after
which c and I follow the unstable trajectory (drawn with reference to E1) that will
put it on S'S' when Dm is actually cut. There always will be a finite initialjump in c
when the news of a future reduction in Dm arrives, except in the limiting case when
the announced monetary growth reduction is infinitely far in the future. One
implication is that if a monetary deceleration is planned, the loss of output and
competitiveness is smaller the further in advance the proposed policy action is
announced.
From eq. (16c) with=O, we obtain
y=((x 1)/4)Dc. (22)
Assume the system starts in long-run equilibrium at t = 0. The net cumulative loss
of output8 following a monetary deceleration is
Jy(t)dt=((c l)/çb)[c(cc)c(0)]. (23)
c(co) is the steady-state real exchange rate which is the same in the initial and the
final long-run equilibrium. c(cx)c(0) is therefore just the initial jump in the real
exchange rate. The cumulative loss of output is minimized by minimizing the
initial jump in c. This is achieved, for a given proposed reduction in Dm by
announcing the reduction as early as possible.
The assumption made so far, that w(t) is a continuous function of time, can be
derived from two more basic assumptions. The first is that w(t) cannot jump
instantaneously in response to new information. In principle this would still
permit discrete jumps in w(t) at some t> t0, where t0 is the instant at which new
information becomes available. The second assumption is an arbitrage condition
for the labour market, which asserts that efficient speculative behaviour in the
labour market eliminates all profit opportunities associated with anticipated
future jumps in w. This assumption is analogous to the arbitrage condition we
have used to rule out anticipated futurejumps in e, although its application to the
labour market is rather less convincing than its use in the foreign exchange
market.
3.5. Gradual adjustmentofcoreinflation with occasional jumps
The final specification of the equation for the core rate of inflation that we shall
8Sinthe adjustment path of output is monotonic in all our examples, y does not change sign
during the transition. The net output loss therefore also equals the gross output loss.For convenience we reproduce the complete model (to be used in section 4)
below [eqs. (1), (2), (8), (9), (4"), (5), (lOa) and (lOb)]:
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consider is given in
Dit=(Dp+D0ir), >O. (4")
This adaptive process for it does not rule out discrete jumps in it, although it is
consistent with our assumption thatthelevel of the money wageis
predetermined. Eq. (4") defines it as a backward-looking weighted average of
past rates of inflation with exponentially declining weights.
it(t) = e -- (Dp(s) + DO(s)) ds. -
Because it(t) is backward-looking it will be associated with a stable eigenvalue. It
is, however, not predetermined.. it(t) depends also on current Dp(t) and DO(s). Ifp
+ 0 makes a discontinuous jump at t = i Dp + DO becomes unbounded and so
does Dir. it therefore jumps. This characteristic of it as a 'dependent'jump variable
- it jumps at t = if and only if p + 0 jumps at t = will be important when we
come to consider the specification of the boundary conditions of this model -
our preferred model.
It is easily checked that the following relation holds for it:




The jump in it istimes the sum of the jumps in p and 0. Rewriting (24) in terms of
the state variables we get
ir(t) x(t)= [(1 o)(c(t) - c(t))+ O(t)O(t)
+ 1(t) - l(t) - (m(t) - m(t fl))]. (24')
If there are no level jumps in m this becomes
it(t)it(t)= ((1 cx)(c(t) - c(t))+ 0(t) - 0(t)). (24")WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting




Dir = (Dp + DO -
De = r - r* -
= m - w,
c=ew.
Its state-space representation is given in eqs. (25) and (26),
c(2öy(1 ci))
[c4(y(l )-5.)(1 )(1 c(1 ök))]
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We now turn to a more detailed study of the behaviour of the model of eqs. (25)
and (26) in section 4.
4. The real exchange rate and the output cost of monetary disinflation in a model
with sluggish 'core' inflation
In this section we solve the model of eqs. (25) and (26) for the time paths of
selected variables, using a particular set of 'plausible' parameter values. The
numerical example is designed to focus on the role of the real and nominal
exchange rate in monetary disinflation. Two common channels of the monetary
transmission mechanism are intentionally closed off. Thus 'core' inflation in the
labour market is backward looking (although ir will jump iff e jumps) and, in
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addition, it is assumed that aggregate demand is interest inelastic: the IS curve is
vertical. The real exchange rate continues to function as an effective channel of
monetary policy, which is successful in bringing down steady-state inflation. We
refer to this as policy A.
We examine the mechanism through which inflation is reduced and calculate
the costs, in terms of lost output, incurred in the process. We also examine an
alternative policy, referred to as policy B, which reduces the long-run rate of
inflation by the same extent without varying the real exchange rate, but following
the same path of output. We note that these policies differ in their effects on the
price level, even in the long run. In the short run, the recession induced by an
overvalued exchange rate will show a sharper fall in the rate of inflation than the
recession of equal magnitude induced by the alternative policy that keeps the real
exchange rate constant. In the former case, there will also be an immediate fall in
the price level, which is absent in the latter. Since the long-run real exchange rate
is independent of the rate of monetary growth, the initial jump decline inc = e - w
under policy A will be followed by a gradual increase in e - w back to its initial
level. On balance, during the adjustment process, De exceeds Dw. While e - w is
unchanged in the long run, the new steady-state paths of both e and w under
policy A lie below the initial steady-state paths and are also lower relative to the
path of the nominal money stock, since the lower steady-state rate of inflation is
associated with a higher stock of real money balances. It is possible (but not
necessary) for e to overshoot its new steady-state path.1° In that case De will not
only exceed Dw on balance during the adjustment process, it will also on balance
exceed the new, lower, rate of monetary growth. [See Buiter and Miller (1981).]
The alternative policy has the same real long-run equilibrium, including the same
stock of real money balances but its long-run price level path lies above the price
level path of policy A. Its endogenously determined long-run nominal money
stock path also lies above the exogenously determined nominal money stock path
of policy A.
We noted that, under policy A on balance after the initial jump appreciation,
De>'Dw, while with the alternative policy of model B, De=Dw. This does not
mean that De will typically be larger with policy A thanwith policy B because the
levels of the new steady state paths of e and w are lower in the former case
than in the latter.
We also briefly consider another policy designed to attain the same reduction
in the rate of inflation as with policy A, but without any los of output. This policy
involves a cut in indirect taxes and (in general) a change in the level of the nominal
stock of money.
As long as w is predetermined, the output cost of achieving a given reduction in
the steady-state rate of inflation (defined as the cumulative net amount of excess
capacity) is entirely independent of the exchange rate. While it may be possible to
'°The slope of this path equals the new rate of monetary growth.264 Wh'. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
so output will change by roughly the change in the rate of monetary growth.
bring forward the anti-inflationary gains, it is not possible to reduce the net
output cost of bringing down inflation by engineering an early appreciation of the
real exchange rate.
4.1. Parameter values
To illustrate the operation of the model we consider the results of choosing
particular values for the parameters as follows:
2=2, k=l, y=O.
Without loss of generality let r* + r = 0 = ra = 0.
With these values substituted into eq. (25) the system becomes
Dl 01 3/16 'U
Dir1/16 1/87/64 ii;+0 (27)
Dc_-1/2 1 1/8 c r*
The characteristic equation is p3p/16-3/64r=O and the determinant is 3/64
(see appendix), u = Dm.
The roots are 0.418 and 0.209±0.2618i and the row eige?vcctor associated
with the positive root /5 is found to be
[u1,u2, 1]=[1.271, 0.499, 1].
4.2. The impact effects of an unanticipated change in monetary growth (dji)
Using these values for ji, t51, ó2 we find (see appendix) the initial jump in
competitiveness is dc=2.8624di, that is, the initial percentage change in
competitiveness will be just under three times the percentage change in monetary
growth announced by the monetary authorities. The immediate effect that this
has on the 'core' rate of inflation is
dir = (1- )dc = dc/80.36 dj.
Given the simple structure of the model, the change in competitiveness will be
associated with an immediate change in output,
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The rate of wage settlements willjump on impact as a result of both the shift in
itand of the recession as follows:
d(Dw) = q5 dy + dir = (4öc +c(1 - c&)) dc = 5dc/ 160.9 du.
4.3. The long-run equilibrium
In a system which is superneutral, one would not expect a change in monetary
growth to affect the equilibrium real interest rate or the real exchange rate,
though nominal interest rates will reflect the monetary slowdown. By setting the
left-hand side of eq. (27) at zero and differentiating with respect to u, we can
confirm that a change in z has no long-run effect on c, but changes it one-for-one.
As the equilibrium nominal rate of interest will also move in line with 4u, the
impact on real balances in the long run is -.2.dj.t.
4.4. The dynamic behaviour of the system
The dynamic behaviour of the variables in the system is summarised in table 1.
In the first column of panel (a) are shown the 'starting values' for I,it and c
discussed above, measured as deviations from their new equilibrium values after a
one point slowdown in monetary growth at t = 0. (All variables are scaled by 100,
so a one-point slowdown in monetary growth will appear as d= - 1.0.) The
second column shows Dl, Dir, Dc at time zero calculated from eq. (27) and from the
first column.
Table I
Starting valuesa Dynamic characteristicsb
See text for derivation of x(0) for 1, m,C;Dx(0) can be obtained by multiplying matrix shown in (27)
into x(0).
bDamping factor p= -0.2090, frequency co=0.2618.
°For which n(0)=1.0, andy follows same path as above (see text).
x(0) Dx(0) B1 B2 B c
(a) 1 -2.0 -0.1055 -2.0 -2.0 -2.8284 0.7854
0.6422 -0.2684 0.6422 -0.5126 -0.8217 2.4680
c -2.8624 0 -2.8625 -2.2862 -3.6634 0.6739
(b) y -1.0734 0 -1.0734 -0.8573 -1.3738 0.6739
Dw 0.1055 -0.2684 0.1055 -0.9413 -0.9472 1.6824
Dc 0 0.3213 0 1.2272 1.2272 1.5708
Dp 0.1055 -0.2019 0.1t55 -0.6345 -0.6432 1.7356
Alternative policy
(c)y -1.0734 0 -1.0734 -0.8573 -1.3738 0.6739
Dp 0.4633 -0.2684 0.4633 -0.6553 -0.8026 2.1862266 Wit.Bujter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
These starting values are chosen so as to place the system on the two-
dimensional stable manifold, on which the stable path of 1,ir, and c can be
described by
x(t) = e"(B, cos wt + B2 sin wt) = B et cos (oit-
where the values for B1, B2, B and t are calculated from the initial conditions in
the first two columns.
The same parameters, calculated in the same manner, are shown for y, Dw, Dc
and Dp in the second panel of table 1. These variables are also measured as
deviations from their new equilibrium values. For output (y) this is zero, by
construction, but for wage and price inflation (Dp and Dw) the new steady state
will correspond to the new rate of monetary growth (n). For convenience, in what
follows, we will assume that the newly chosen rate of monetary growth is zero, so
that there is no inflation in the new equilibrium.
A check on the calculations contained in the table, and some indication of how
the policy works, is obtained by integrating the paths shown there for Dw and Dp.
The formula1' which gives the required integral is
$ x(t)dt =(pB1 + wB2)/(p2 + w2),
where B, and B2 are shown in the body of the table and the values for p and w are
given in note b to the table. Applying this we find
JDw(t)dt= 2.0 and$Dp(t)dt= 1.2843.
The discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that the price level shows an
instantaneous discrete fall at time zero, which is not picked up in the integration.
The fall will be simply (1 - c) dc, where dc measures the initial impact of the
monetary policy on competitiveness. The initial loss of competitiveness is
2.864 (see the first entry in the third row of the table), and 1 -is 0.25, which
provides a figure of 0.7 156 for the initial fall in the price level. Together with the
integral reported above, this gives a total of 2.0 for the long-run effect on the
price level. Thus the real wage is unchanged in the long-run, as one would
expected from a model which is 'superneutral'. (The 2% fall in the price level is
required to increase real balances to satisfy the higher demand for liquidity at the
lower nominal interest prevailing when prices are stable.)
The cyclical path towards this long-run value is sketched in fig. 11. In the top
panel of the figure, by choice of units, both the price level and the money stock can
















A NDm = 0
time
time
be represented by the same line, GB, until the time t = 0 of the monetary
slowdown. The money stock levels off at point B, and the price level jumps down
(because of the jump-appreciation of e) and then rises for a while as shown by the
path labelled AA. In the lower panel of fig. 11, the paths after t = 0 for monetary
growth (the axis and the rate of price inflation (AA) are shown. It is evident from
the fact that the initial rate is only a little above zero that this policy has a prompt
effect upon inflation. This effect is due to two factors; the immediate fall in core
inflation (by about- from 1.0 to 0.6422; see table 1, column 1, row 2) and the
recession in output (of just over 1.0; see table 1, column 1, row 4).268 WH. Bulter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
This rapid fall in inflation might lead one to be optimistic about the costs of
eliminating inflation as measured by the size and duration of the recession. But if
we measure the output costs of checking inflation simply by the unweighted
integral of y (which means that some of the recession is cancelled out by
subsequent boom as output cycles towards equilibrium) the following expression
for the cumulative net loss of output can be obtained:
Jy(t)dt=()/cq5.
With ji= 1.0 and=0.25, the cumulative net output cost required to
bring down the steady-state inflation rate by 1 percentage point is four 'point-
years' loss of output.12
Our model ignores possible benefits from bringing down inflation slowly
due to non-linearities in the Phillips curve which might cause two years with
5% excess capacity to have a stronger counterinflationary effect than 1 year
with 10% excess capacity. The evidence on this is, however, by no means clear.
We now consider alternative policies which specifically avoid any fluctuations
in competitiveness. We see how they compare with what we have just seen for
policy A in terms of the speed with which inflation is reduced and the cost in terms
of lost output.
4.5. Alternative policies
In order to see how much the initial loss of competitiveness contributes to the
speed with which inflation is reduced and to cutting the cost of reducing inflation
we consider alternative policies which keep competitiveness constant at its long-
run equilibrium value throughout. If competitiveness is thus kept constant
and c=ew=0, the price level and the wage rate will move together, as can
be seen from eq. (8). As a consequence the inflation process in the model
reducestothefamiliar augmented Phillipscurve commonly usedto
characterize closed economies. We get
Dp=çby+ir, (28)
= (Dp -it). (4")
The stabilization of the real exchange rate precludes both the discrete adjustment
to the core rate of inflationit,which was a feature of the previous policy, as well as
any discrete jumps in the price level. Bothitand p are predetermined. Given the
'2As a measure of economic waste, Jy(t)dt is only really useful if y(t) does not change sign
on the interval0, x). Zero net output loss is consistent with periods of prolonged and large
excess supply Followed by periods of prolonged and large excess demand. A more appropriate
index of economic waste might be S'Iy(t)Idt, which penalizes all deviations of output from
capacity output in the same way.WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting 269
initial level of core inflation it(0)=i= 1.0, the initial value of the price level p(0)
and a path for real output, eqs. (28) and (4") will by themselves generate the entire
path to be followed by the price level. Note that, by construction, money has
become a complete 'side-show'. Two of the transmission mechanisms, the real
balance effect and an interest rate effect in the goods market, have been ruled
out from the start. Now that the real exchange rate is also kept constant, there is
no feedback from money on real output. Since the model has the standard
homogeneity properties, it will of course still be true that in the long run the rate
of inflation equals the rate of growth of the money supply. As will become clear,
however, the truism that 'inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon' should in the current example be turned around: money here is an
inflation phenomenon.
The first alternative policy (called B) takes the path of output to be precisely the
same as that generated by the monetary contraction just described with policy A.
This can be achieved e.g. by adding a fiscal instrument g to the IS curve so that
y=&cc+jg, >0. (29)
With c kept constant at 0, we can duplicate policy A's real output path by
making g follow the exact path of &c under policy A. The real exchange rate
could e.g. be stabilized by adopting the exchange rate management rule that De
= Dw. This then implies of course that De = Dp. With the exchange rate thus
managed, the nominal money stock is endogenously determined. When De = Dw
= Dp, the nominal interest rate is given by r =r* + De = r* + Dp. The LM
equation (1) then becomes
m=p_2(r* +Dp)+ky=p_tr* +(kA4')y-2it. (30)
With p anditpredetermined and y determined by (29) with c = 0, eq. (30)
determines the nominal money stock. Other ways of stabilizing the real exchange
rate such as a variable tax on capital inflows (subsidy on outflows) can be thought
of. In the present example the inflation generated by eqs. (28), (4") and (29) (with c
= 0) is the dog wagging the money supply tail through eq. (30). Given eqs.(28) and
(4"), it will of course always be the case that the path of inflation is determined
once a path for output is specified. If other transmission mechanisms of monetary
policy, such as an interest rate effect and a real balance effect in the output market,
are included in the model, however, it is less straightforward (although possible)
to specify an output path without reference to the money supply.
The results of the alternative policy for inflation are shown in the bottom row
of table 1. Inflation starts at a significantly higher level than before with policy A
because the starting value for core inflation it is now /1= 1.0. The path followed by
inflation has the same damping factor p and frequency w as the output path but
the amplitude is smaller and the inflation cycle leads the output cycle. The rate of
inflation will, as before, be reduced to zero at a net cost of 4 point-years of output.270 WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
The price level towards which the system converges under the alternative policy
is, however, higher than the long-run price level of policy A. This can be seen from
the coefficients in table 1. Whilej) DpA(t)d(t)= 2 for model A, as we have





These results are illustrated in fig. 11 where the path followed by the price level
and the rate of inflation under policy B are plotted alongside those already
described for policy A. In the top panel the price level under the alternative policy
proceeds from point B without any 'jump' along a path (BB) which cycles
around a steady state level which is 4/3 of a point above the steady state
price level for policy A.
In the bottom panel the rate of inflation is shown starting at point B and
cycling towards zero along the path BB. Thus inflation starts at a higher level
under the alternative policy than under the floating exchange rate case. The
determination of those 'starting values' and the subsequent comparison of
inflation can be seen from fig.12. There, labelled SRPCB, is the 'short-run
Phillips curve' which determines initial inflation under policy B where ltB(0) =
This value of it determines the intercept of SRPCB, and the value of y(0)
determines the values of inflation shown as DpB(0). From this point inflation and
output cycle towards the origin as shown by the path labelled BB.
By contrast the relationship determining inflation under policy A (after the
initial jump at time zero),
(1ic)
DpA(0) = 4)y(0) + 7tA(0) + Dy(0) = 4)y(0) + itA(0)
asDy(0)=0,
yields the Phillips curve shown as SRPCA which has an intercept of itA(0) which
is lower than 1t(0) because ofthejump induced by the revaluation of the currency at
the inception of the monetary slowdown under floating rates. Thereafter inflation
falls away following the path shown as AA.
The gap between the two paths in fig. 12, D, can be plotted against time.
Its dynamic characteristics (after the jump in PA) are obtained from table 1 where
Dp DpA - DpB = et( 0.3 578 cos wt + 0.0208 sin wt)
=0.3583 et cos(wt 3.0855).The path of Dfl is therefore sinusoidal and its integral is 0.6 183, which together
with the initial jump in the price level, gives the figure of 4/3 as the long-run
difference in the price level resulting from the two policies.
What is apparent from the above is that the policy of fighting inflation by cycles
in output and in the real exchange rate (with an initial recession associated with an
overvalued exchange rate) does not lead to any change in long-run inflation,
compared to the same output cycle and a stable real exchange rate. The loss of
competitiveness does however reduce inflation more quickly early on, as shown
in fig. 12; the early lead established by this policy over the alternative is whittled
away later when competitiveness is regained in the boom, but we are left with the
conclusion that inflation is brought down more quickly with policy A, as shown
by the solid line in fig. 12. (Inflation under the alternative policy is shown by the
dotted line.)
The fluctuations of the real exchange rate can therefore be seen to have effects
on inflation not unlike those attributed to temporary incomes policies by those
who argue that the latter hold down inflation in the short run, but have no effect
on the inflation rate in the long run. If that is true, then a temporary bout of
Dp
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Fig. 12. Inflation under the two policies.272 WH. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting
incomes policy would change only the long-run price level without changing the
long-run growth of prices, which is what we have found to be characteristic of the
policy of permitting the real exchange rate to vary.
4.6. 'Efficient disinflationary policies"3
Once we permit changes in the indirect tax rate, 0, we have a way of costlessly
reducing inflation. Consider the money demand function and the wage equation,
m - p 0 = - Ar + ky,
Dw==çby+ir.
Given a reduction in the rate of monetary growth by dp = - ji, we can easily
calculate the change in 0 required to jump it to its new long-run equilibrium
value,Holding p constant, eq. (24) shows that dn(t)dO(t). The required
change in 0 is therefore given by
dO-1dir =-1dp.
From the money market equilibrium condition we obtain that, since the long-run
interest rate changes in line witht,
d(m - pU) = A dr = - A d.
Holding p constant this yields
dmdO= Adj.tor dm=(-2+')d.
Therefore a change in the rate of monetary growth by d1t, accompanied by a
change in indirect taxes by c' dt and a change in the level of the nominal money
stock of ( - A +) dji will immediately move the system to the new steady-state
equilibrium with the lower rate of inflation. Output and the real exchange rate are
unaffected. With our choice of parameter values (A = 2 and = 0.5), dO = 2 dt and
dm = 0.
The mechanism permitting the required reduction in inflation to be brought
about without loss of output is the following. First, the cut in 0 (in general
together with the change in m) permits the long-run change in the stock of real
money balances to be brought about immediately without any need for a jump in
nominal prices, including the exchange rate. Second, the cut in 0 achieves the
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immediate change in the core rate of inflation to its new long-run value. The use of
indirect taxes to facilitate the process of bringing down inflation has been
advocated frequently by Okun (1978).
Alternatively, incomes policy can be used to jumpit.If incomes policy can be
identified with a once-and-for-all reduction init,without any other 'overwriting'
of the behavioural equations of the model, then it will lower the cost of
disinflation. If monetary policy changes or announcements themselves directly
changeit,as is the case in the model of section 2, then disinflationary monetary
policies will also be 'efficient' in the sense we are using that term here.
5. Conclusion
After a summary of various approaches to the modelling of the inflationary
process in an open economy with a floating exchange rate, we have studied the
way in which a monetary slowdown might be expected to work in an economy
where core inflation is sluggish, and adjusts to actual inflation with a significant
(mean) lag.
Despite such sluggishness we found that core inflation can be reduced quickly
by jumps in the price level induced by jumps in the exchange rate. In the simple
model used to focus on this particular aspect of the monetary transmission
mechanism we found that, even without any direct real balance and real interest
rate effects on aggregate demand, a monetary slowdown might nevertheless cut
inflation promptly via its impact on the nominal and the real exchange rate.
Indeed our numerical example has the property that the inflation responds
immediately by almost the full extent of the monetary slowdown! This reduction
of inflation follows, in our example, from the effects of announced monetary
policy on the exchange rate. The appreciation of the exchange rate cuts the
inflation rate in two ways, first by reducing core inflation and second by cutting
the level of output. Both of these effects involve sharp changes in the real
exchange rate.
Since the model is 'superneutral', however, such changes in the real exchange
rate and in real output must ultimately be reversed. Pursuit of a constant growth
rate of money generates a cyclical convergence for these variables. The net output
costs associated with a steady state reduction in inflation are found to be given by
a simple formula, d/4 where di shows the change in steady state inflation, 4' is
the slope of the short-run Phillips curve andmeasures the speed of adjustment
of core inflation. Thus forc= 4 =- the net output loss associated with reducing
monetary growth and steady state inflation by 1% is 4 point-years of GNP.
For comparison we considered an alternative where the real exchange was held
constant but output was constrained to follow the same path as before. Such an
alternative, whose net output loss is of course identical, was found to achieve the
same effect on steady state inflation, but the path taken by inflation was different.274 W.H. Buiter and Pet. hillier, Real exchange rate overshooting
The prompt anti-inflation success due to the loss of competitiveness being absent,
inflation starts from a higher level under this alternative. The early lead achieved
by the policy of'overvaluing' the currency is never entirely lost, so that the long-
run price level is lower than is true for the alternative policy.
In a superneutral model, with core inflation modelled in the way we have, it
turns out that any path for output which exhibits a cumulative 4 point-years loss
of output will (if çb=) reduce steady state inflation by 1%, irrespective of the
path taken by the real exchange rate (provided it starts and finishes at the same
level). Thus the freedom to vary the real exchange rate in order to reduce inflation
does not succeed in reducing the output costs of changing steady state inflation; it
does however change the time path of inflation, relative to other policies which
exhibit the same output path.
While the numerical model makes no claim to being a realistic model of the
U.K., we would point out that the sort of output costs associated with reductions
in medium term inflation in Treasury evidence to the Treasury Committee
suggested a figure of 4 point-years of output for each 1 point of medium-term
inflation. A more detailed analysis of simulations on an earlier version of the
Treasury model, when the slope of the Phillips curve was flatter and the mean lag
of core inflation longer, showed even higher costs [see Miller (1979)].
In considering 'efficient' disinflationary policies, we noted ttiat a cut in indirect
taxes could reduce the output costs of curing inflation by securing an immediate
jump reduction in the price index at market prices and in the core rate of inflation.
In our model a reduction in the rate of growth of money by d.t accompanied by a
cut in indirect taxes of' dp will immediately and costlessly achievea reduction
in steady state inflation of dji. (In general a change in the level of the money stock
will also be required.)
In the U.K., a one point cut in VAT is reckoned to cut the rate of indirect
taxation by a half a point. A 4 point reduction in VAT would therefore avoid the
four point-years of output loss otherwise associated with a point reduction in
monetary growth. The present administration's decision to raise VAT by 8 points
early in their term of office, at the same time that a programme of successive
reductions in monetary growth was announced, would in our model increase the
cost of bringing down inflation. In the short run, however, the adverse
consequences of the VAT increase on the price level are countered by the
appreciation of the exchange rate.
Those who argue that incomes policies can secure a step reduction in core
inflation, would of course advocate their use as a way of cutting the output costs
of reducing inflation [see, for example, Tobin (1977)]. We have not examined this
case in detail in this paper. We have however, considered the possibility that
announced monetary policy could immediately and directly reduce core inflation
in just such a fashion. If announced monetary policy has this sort of direct
expectational effect, then it will save output costs, just as a similarly successful
incomes policy would. If, however, monetary targets only secure immediateWil. Buiter and M. Miller, Real exchange rate overshooting 275
effects on core inflation by a sudden loss of competitiveness, this will not
constitute an 'efficient' way of reducing inflation.
Appendix: Derivation of the initial conditions
First, we note that when aggregate demand is completely interest inelastic (i.e.,
y = 0), the term A in (25) and (26) becomesand, omitting 0, r* + and r,






where the determinant of the coefficient matrix A in (27) is given by 12
and the characteristic equation,f(p)=0 where p is a root, is
p3 - [(2_i - )(1 -) +(k2 k5]p2
-[(2 '- )4&+ (l )2 ']p- Q=0. (A.2)
As can be seen from the characteristic equation,f(0) <0 as Q> 0, butf(p) tends
to infinity when p tends to infinity; hence there exists one positive root, which is
not surprising given the presence of the forward looking variable, c. The other
two roots must be stable for the model to make sense. (For most plausible values
of the parameters these other roots will turn out to be complex, as we see below.)
The row eigenvector v' associated with any root must satisfy the condition that
v'[pIA]=Z' where Z' denotes the zero vector. Normalizing the eigenvector
appropriately, this means
p 1 a13
[v1 v2 1](l_)2_1 p+(l) a23=[0 0 0],
1pa33
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where the last column is not given in full for simplicity. This implies
v1 = I v2(p+(I ce)),
v2= l/((I )p2(2'p)').
To ensure stability, the path to be followed by the system must not depend on
the eigenvector associated with the positive (unstable) root. Dixit (1980) has
shown that for a previously unanticipated immediately implemented shock this
can be achieved by ensuring that the product of this eigenvector with the initial
values of the variables (measured as deviations from the new long-run
equilibrium) equals zero, i.e.,
13(1(0)+ i32(it(0) - ) (c(0) - = 0. (A.4)
ff andare the new long-run equilibrium values of 1, it and c and i5and 132 are
elements associated with the unstable root.
Let Dmu. The terms measuringinitialdisequilibrium following an
unanticipated change in p, denoted dii, can be evaluated as follows:
(A.5)
c(0)=dc,the jump in competitiveness,
where fi' denotes the new value of .
From eq. (24") we know that
dit=(I c)dc,
and so the initial disequilibrium initbecomes
n(0)=(1 )dcd.
Hence eq. (A.4) can be rewritten as
t51.dp + v2((1 c&)dcd1t)dc=0,
and so the initial change in competitiveness found to be
t52- dc= dj.
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